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Empirical studies suggest that monetary
policy shocks have real economic effects that
continue for many quarters after a policy
change is implemented.
1 These persistent real
effects have sometimes been attributed to price
contracts that are staggered across firms. In
principle, staggered price setting can substan-
tially delay the aggregate price level’s response
to policy shocks even if each individual price is
fixed for only a short period. However, this
result depends on the assumption that each firm
seeks to keep its price close to the prices others
charge. Recently, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2000)—hereafter CKM—have questioned the
validity of this assumption. For a wide range of
technology and taste specifications, CKM
demonstrate that staggered price adjustment
speeds up—rather than slows down—the
economy’s response to policy shocks.
Part 1 in this series of two articles de-
velops the intuition underlying the CKM result
(Koenig 1999). It runs as follows: The prices its
competitors charge are relevant to the pricing
decisions of a profit-maximizing firm only indi-
rectly, through their impact on the firm’s unit
labor costs. If, say, the money stock has unex-
pectedly increased, unit labor costs will rise for
two reasons. First, since most firms’ prices are
preset, the policy surprise will lead to an
increase in real cash balances that stimulates
aggregate sales and, hence, the demand for
labor. Second, households, feeling wealthier,
will be less inclined to work. For reasonable
values of the wage and wealth elasticities of the
labor supply, these two forces exert such a
strong upward pressure on the market-clearing
wage rate that any firm with the chance to
adjust its price will increase it more than pro-
portionately to the change in the money
stock—not less than proportionately, as re-
quired to generate persistence.
This discussion suggests that what occurs
in the labor market is critical for determining
whether output prices adjust slowly toward long-
run equilibrium following a monetary policy
shock. If a labor-market friction were to short-
circuit the wage increase that accompanies a
monetary expansion in the CKM analysis, firms
would feel less immediate pressure to raise their
prices and monetary policy might have longer
lasting effects on the real economy. This article
uses a simple model to illustrate that labor-
market frictions are, indeed, a potentially im-
portant part of the solution to the persistence
problem.
The model economy developed here can
be interpreted in two ways. Under one inter-
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pretation, hours of labor supplied by different
households (or groups of households) are
imperfect substitutes in production. This imper-
fect substitutability gives workers a measure of
monopoly power. Each worker (or worker
group) acts as a wage setter, announcing a time
path for the wage at which he is willing to sup-
ply labor.
2 This path is periodically revised to
reflect new information on demand and supply
conditions. The timing of the wage revisions is
staggered across workers. Essentially, the stag-
gered price setting of Part 1 is replaced by 
staggered wage setting.
An alternative interpretation of the model
is that each household acts as an independent
intermediate-goods producer. The intermediate
goods different households produce are imper-
fect substitutes for one another. Price adjust-
ment in the intermediate-goods market is stag-
gered. Under this interpretation of the model,
the key difference from the previous analysis is
that intermediate-goods producers do not com-
pete with one another for labor.
3
Under either interpretation, the model cap-
tures important aspects of reality. Wage rates are
commonly specified well in advance—by as
much as three years in union labor contracts.
4 At
the same time, transportation costs, imperfect
information, and workers’ investments in firm-
specific skills limit employee mobility.
The article’s bottom line is that explaining
persistence may not be that difficult after all.
Indeed, if there are labor-market frictions, mone-
tary policy can reasonably be expected to have
long-lasting real effects even if final-goods prices
are completely flexible.
5 If final-goods prices 
are set in overlapping contracts, persistence is
further enhanced.
THE MODEL ECONOMY
This section describes a simple, log-linear
economy with labor-market frictions. I arbitrarily
emphasize the sticky-wage interpretation of the
model rather than the immobile-labor interpre-
tation. As in Part 1 of this series, several sim-
plifying assumptions are convenient. For ex-
ample, I ignore capital investment. Labor contracts
specify a path for the nominal wage rather than
a fixed wage level.
6 Also, most of the analysis is




As in my earlier analysis, I assume that a
typical household—call it household i—has a
utility function of the form
(1) U(Ci, Li) = (Ci
1 – σ – 1)/(1 – σ )
– Li
1 + 1/ξ /(1 + 1/ξ )
each period, where Ci and  Li are the levels 
of output consumed and labor supplied, re-
spectively, and where σ and ξ are positive con-
stants. The first of these parameters is the
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution, which measures households’ willingness
to shift consumption over time. The second
parameter would be the wage elasticity of the
labor supply if the labor market were competi-
tive. Realistically, σ≥ ½ and ξ < 1.
8
A wage-taking, utility-maximizing house-
hold would supply labor up to the point where
the marginal rate of substitution between leisure
and consumption equals the real wage:  –UL/UC
= W/P. However, I assume each household faces
a downward-sloping demand curve for its labor:
(2) li = l – (wi – w)/(1 – E ),
where l and w are the (logarithms of the) aver-
age aggregate employment level and money
wage, respectively, wi is the (logarithm of the)
wage charged by household i, and 0 < E < 1 is
a parameter that is an inverse measure of the
household’s monopoly power.
9 (Throughout
this article, lowercase characters denote loga-
rithms of the corresponding uppercase vari-
ables.) Confronting a labor demand schedule
like that in Equation 2, household i will want to
be paid a premium over the competitive wage.
In particular, taking l and w as given, household
i will want to charge a wage rate that satisfies
the equation
(3) Wi/P = –(UL/UC)/E.
Taking logarithms,
(3′ ) wi – p = (1/ ξ )li + σ ci –  ,
where   ≡ ln(E ). The desired wage exceeds the
competitive wage to the extent that E is less
than 1.
My objective is to see whether staggered
wage setting can help explain the persistent 
real effects of monetary policy. Accordingly, I
assume each household must specify in
advance a path for its wage rate. The length of
time for which the wage path is preset is the
same for every household, but the timing of
their decisions differs. As a practical matter, to
assume that households prespecify their wages
means Equations 3 and 3′ will not hold for
every household at every instant. However,
whenever it has a chance to reset its wage path,
household i will choose a path that it expects
will satisfy Equations 3 and 3′ at each point in13 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  FOURTH QUARTER 2000
the future. Firms decide how much of house-
hold  i’s labor is hired at the specified wage.
Households will be content to cede short-run
control of hours to firms as long as the real
wage continues to exceed the marginal rate of
substitution between leisure and consumption.
10
As in Part 1, I assume households’ desired
money balances are determined by their con-
sumption expenditures:
(4) mi – p = ci.
It greatly simplifies the analysis to assume
households are able to fully insure consumption
against idiosyncratic differences in the timing of
wage decisions. In other words, it is convenient
to assume all households end up with the same
level of consumption and, hence, the same level
of real money balances, regardless of when they
are able to reset their wage paths. Accordingly,
I henceforth drop the subscripts from c and m
in Equations 3′ and 4.
Firm Decisionmaking
Firms use the labor of a cross section of
households to produce output, which is then
sold back to households. I use the same, simple,
linear production technology as in Part 1:
(5) yf = lf ,
where yf is the amount of output firm f pro-
duces using lf units of labor. It follows that the
firm’s marginal cost schedule is horizontal and
that its height equals the prevailing average
wage rate, w.
In general, the products of different firms
are imperfect substitutes, so that each firm has
some monopoly power in the output market. 
In particular, I assume the demand for firm f ’s 
output is given by
(6) yf = y – (pf – p)/(1 – Θ ),
where y and p are the average aggregate out-
put level and price level, respectively, pf is the
price charged by firm f, and 0 < Θ < 1. Equation
6 says the higher firm f ’s price is relative to 
the economywide average, the lower the firm’s
sales will be relative to economywide-average
sales.
11 Perfect competition is obtained in the
limit as Θ→ 1. The firm is assumed to be small
enough that it takes y and p as given. It follows
that the firm’s marginal revenue is pf + θ , where
θ≡ ln(Θ ) < 0.
Profit is maximized when marginal reve-
nue equals marginal cost:
(7) pf = w – θ .
In contrast to CKM (and my earlier article), out-
put prices are perfectly flexible, so that
Equation 7 holds at every instant for every firm.
(This assumption is relaxed in the box that
accompanies this article.) If the price level
responds sluggishly to monetary policy shocks,
it is only because the average aggregate wage
responds sluggishly to such shocks.
Short-Run and Long-Run Equilibrium Conditions
For notational convenience, I assume there
is one household per firm. Then y denotes both
the output each firm produces and average
household income. The variable l denotes both
the amount of labor each firm hires and the
average amount of labor each household sup-
plies. At every instant, l = y = c = m – p, where
(recall) the variables c and m are the amounts
of output consumed by and money held by
each household, respectively. It follows that if
we can determine how the price level moves
over time in response to a monetary policy
shock, we will also know how employment, out-
put, and consumption move over time. Mone-
tary policy shocks have persistent real effects
only to the extent that the price level reacts
sluggishly to changes in the money supply.
Once every household has adjusted its
wage path in response to a policy shock, all
households will charge the same wage and
work the same number of hours. If we use 
an asterisk to denote the value each endoge-
nous variable takes on in this long-run, market-
clearing equilibrium,
(8) y * = c* = l * = (θ +  )ξ /(1 + σξ ),
(9) w* = m + θ – (θ +  )ξ /(1 + σξ ),
and
(10) p* = m – (θ +  )ξ /(1 + σξ ).
Money is neutral in the long run. An increase 
in the money stock eventually drives up the
nominal wage and the price level and leaves
real variables unchanged.
SHORT-RUN WAGE AND PRICE ADJUSTMENT
Equation 7 implies that the average wage
and the price level always move together. Thus,
whether the price level reacts sluggishly to pol-
icy shocks is determined by how the average
wage moves over time in response to unex-
pected changes in the stock of money. How the
average wage moves over time is, in turn, deter-
mined by how aggressively households that are
able to adjust their wages do so. Do these
households have an incentive to keep theirFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 14
wages close to the average wage? If so, the
average wage will move slowly toward its mar-
ket-clearing level and policy shocks will have
long-lasting real effects.
An Individual Household’s Wage Demands
Consider a household (i) that is updat-
ing its wage demands in response to the latest
economic data. Using Equation 2 to eliminate 
li from Equation 3′ , and using the fact that l = c
= m – p:
(11) wi = w + α [(1/ξ + σ )(m – p) – (θ +  )],
where α≡ξ (1 – E )/[1 + ξ (1 – E)] < 1. This equa-
tion becomes
(11′ )0 = α [(1/ξ + σ )(m – p*) – (θ +  )]
in long-run, market-clearing equilibrium. By
subtracting Equation 11′ from Equation 11, we
obtain
(12) wi = w + α (1/ξ + σ )(p* – p),
or (recalling that Equation 7 holds for every firm
at every instant)
(12′ ) wi = w + α (1/ξ + σ )(w* – w).
Equation 12′ is the key formula relating the
wage demands of household i to the current
average wage and the market-clearing wage. If
α (1/ξ + σ ) < 1, households with a chance to
respond to a policy shock choose a wage part-
way between the market-clearing wage and the
average wage; they don’t want their wages to
move too far from the wages others charge. If,
on the other hand, α (1/ξ + σ ) > 1, households
with a chance to respond to a policy shock pick
a wage that exceeds the market-clearing wage
rate. Below, I refer to ω′ ≡ α (1/ξ + σ ) as the
overshooting parameter for an economy with
staggered wage contracts.
A Comparison with Price Adjustment 
in the CKM Model
In the simple version of the CKM model
developed in Part 1 of this series, price adjust-
ment is governed by an equation very similar to
the wage-adjustment equation derived above. In
particular,
(13) pf = p + (1/ξ + σ )(p* – p),
where pf is the price chosen by a firm able to
respond to the policy shock, p* is the market-
clearing price level, and p is the average current
price level. The key difference between
Equations 12′ and 13 is the α parameter, which
appears in the former equation but is absent
from the latter. This parameter acts unambigu-
ously to make wage (and hence, price) adjust-
ment in the staggered-wage-contract model
slower than price adjustment in the CKM stag-
gered-price-contract model. In the staggered-
price economy, the overshooting parameter is 
ω≡ 1/ξ + σ . In the staggered-wage economy,
the overshooting parameter is ω′ = αω < ω .
Is the contribution of staggered wage set-
ting to persistence likely to be quantitatively 
significant? Table 1 compares the values of ω
and ω′ implied by a range of reasonable values
for the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (σ ), the wage elasticity of the labor
supply (ξ ), and the ratio of the competitive to
the monopolistically competitive wage (E ).
12
The table suggests that ω can reasonably be
expected to fall somewhere between 3 (when 
σ = 1 and ξ = 1/2) and 7 (when σ = 2 and 
ξ = 1/5). (Note that the competitiveness of the
labor market is irrelevant for ω .) In any event,
the overshooting parameter in an economy with
flexible wages and overlapping price contracts
is well above 1—a result consistent with CKM.
In sharp contrast, the overshooting parameter in
an economy with flexible prices and overlap-
ping wage contracts ranges from a low of 0.01
(when the labor supply is highly inelastic and
the labor market is nearly competitive) to a high
of only about 1/3 (when ξ = 1/2 and E = .8). In
other words, the overshooting parameter is at
least an order of magnitude smaller in an econ-
omy with staggered wage setting than it is in 
an economy with staggered price setting. If
workers don’t have much bargaining leverage, it
may well be several orders of magnitude
smaller. The implication is that staggered wage
Table 1
Overshooting Unlikely with Overlapping Wage Contracts
Possible values of the overshooting parameter in an economy with flexible prices and
overlapping wage contracts (ω′ ) and in an otherwise identical economy with flexible
wages and overlapping price contracts (ω ).
A. The case in which σ = 1.
ωω ′
E = .99 E = .95 E = .90 E = .85 E = .80
ξ = 1/5 6 .01 .06 .12 .17 .23
ξ = 1/4 5 .01 .06 .12 .18 .24
ξ = 1/3 4 .01 .07 .13 .19 .25
ξ = 1/2 3 .01 .07 .14 .21 .27
B.The case in which σ = 2.
ωω ′
E = .99 E = .95 E = .90 E = .85 E = .80
ξ = 1/5 7 .01 .07 .14 .20 .27
ξ = 1/4 6 .01 .07 .15 .22 .29
ξ = 1/3 5 .02 .08 .16 .24 .31
ξ = 1/2 4 .02 .10 .19 .28 .3615 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  FOURTH QUARTER 2000
contracts are far more likely to generate persis-
tence than are staggered price contracts of the
same length.
Tracking the Economy Over Time
In this section, I use a series of figures to
illustrate the impact labor-market imperfections
can have on the economy’s response to a mon-
etary policy shock. (For a more general treat-
ment, see the box entitled “The Short-Run
Dynamics of an Economy with Labor-Market
Frictions.”) These figures assume that ω′ = 
.25—an overshooting parameter that is toward
the upper end of the range in Table 1 and that,
accordingly, may understate persistence. For
comparison, the figures also show the policy
responses of an economy with flexible wages
and overlapping price contracts. For this econ-
omy, I assume ω = 4.5—the same value my ear-
lier article uses and near the middle of the range
in Table 1.
The policy shock I consider is a surprise,
temporary increase in the money growth rate
that permanently raises the level of the money
stock 1 percent above what the public had
expected. I arbitrarily assume the money-
growth surge lasts one-twelfth as long as con-
tracts do. So if contracts specify the wage path
for a year at a time, money growth remains ele-
vated for only one month.
13 (See Panel 1 of
Figure 1.) The market-clearing price, p*, rises
with the money stock, reaching a new, perma-
nently higher level in one month (Panel 2).
Panels 2 and 3 show the paths of the aver-
age price level and rate of production in the
economy with overlapping wage contracts
(assuming  ω′ = .25) and the economy with 
overlapping price contracts (assuming ω = 4.5).
Clearly, price and output adjustment take sub-
stantially longer in the staggered-wage economy
than in the staggered-price economy. (As the
box discusses, price and output adjustment are
even further delayed if staggered wage and
staggered price setting are combined.) With
staggered wages, it takes 9.6 months for the
price level to move halfway to its long-run, mar-
ket-clearing level, compared with 2.2 months
with staggered prices.
14 Similarly, the output
response is larger and longer lasting in the stag-
gered wage economy than in the staggered-
price economy. These results are consistent
with the view that persistent real monetary 
policy effects are much easier to obtain in an
economy with labor-market imperfections than
in an economy without such imperfections.
It is important to note that the differences
between the staggered-price and staggered-
wage economies seen in Figure 1 are not due to
any difference in contract length between the
two economies: in both, contract length is one
year. Price adjustment and output adjustment
are slower in the staggered-wage economy than
in the staggered-price economy solely because
households’ incentive to keep their wages close
to the average wage in the former economy is
stronger than firms’ incentive to keep their
prices close to the average price in the latter
Figure 1
Response to a Monetary Policy Shock
Panel 3: Implied Paths of Output
(deviations from the initial equilibrium)
Panel 2: Implied Paths of the Market-Clearing
and Average Price Levels
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Consider an economy that is initially in long-run, market-
clearing equilibrium, with (for notational convenience) a con-
stant money stock. Suddenly, at t = 0, a change in the money
stock’s path is announced.The announcement is a complete
surprise but fully credible. Without any loss of generality, we
can define the unit time interval to equal the length of a labor
contract.Then, by t = 1 every household will have had a
chance to reset its wage path, and the economy will be back
in market-clearing equilibrium.This box derives the formulas
that govern the behavior of output, wages, and the price level
over the interval from t = 0 to t = 1. I begin with the case in
which final-goods prices are completely flexible, then briefly
discuss how the analysis would differ in an economy with
overlapping price contracts.
Flexible Final-Goods Prices. The basic building blocks
for the analysis are the equations
(B.1) w *(t) = m(t) + θ – (θ +  )ξ /(1 + σξ ),
(B.2) wi(t) = w(t) + ω′ [w *(t) – w(t)],
and
(B.3) w(t) = twi(t) + (1 – t)w(0).
Equation B.1 gives the market-clearing wage as a function of
the current money stock. It restates Equation 9 from the main
text. Similarly, Equation B.2 is a restatement of Equation 12′ .
It gives the wage rate that will be chosen at time t by any
household that has had a chance to react to the new mone-
tary policy. Finally, Equation B.3 is a formula for the average
wage that follows from the assumption that wage adjustment
is evenly staggered over the unit interval. At any given time t,
0 < t < 1, the fraction t of households will have had a chance
to reset their wage paths and will be charging wi(t).The
fraction 1 – t of households will be charging the wage that
prevailed in the initial market-clearing equilibrium, w(0).
1
Together, Equations B.2 and B.3 imply that
Since every firm sets its price as a markup over the average
wage (compare Equation 7), we also have
where the market-clearing price level is proportional to the
current money stock (Equation 10).This equation is the
same as that governing price adjustment in an economy with
staggered price setting, except ω′ has replaced ω . (Compare
Equation B.5, above, with Equation B.4 in Part 1 of this series.)
Price adjustment is one-half complete when ω′ t/[ω′ t + (1 – t)]
= 1/2, or t = 1/(1 + ω′ ). So the smaller the overshooting
parameter, ω′ , the slower the aggregate price adjustment.
Recall that our units of measurement are chosen so 
that average employment and output both equal real money
balances at every instant: l(t) = y(t) = m(t) – p(t). Using
Equations 10 and B.5, it follows that
Equations B.5 and B.6 are the basis for Panels 2 and 3 of
Figure 1 in the main text.
Staggered Final-Goods Prices. Staggered price
setting adds to persistence when present in an economy with
labor-market frictions. It also causes the real wage to vary
procyclically. I illustrate these facts in the special case where
price contracts have the same length as wage contracts.
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The Short-Run Dynamics of an Economy with Labor-Market Frictions
When there are staggered final-goods price contracts,
Equation 7 applies only to firms that have had a chance to
reset their price paths following the monetary shock. While
Equation 12 remains valid, Equation 12′ , in general, does not.
Hence, we must go back a step and replace Equation B.2 with
(B.7) pf(t )=   w(t) – θ
and
(B.8) wi(t) = w(t) + ω′ [p*(t) – p(t)],
which are simply restatements of Equations 7 and 12, respec-
tively, in the main text. While previously we had p(t )=pf(t ),
now
(B.9) p(t ) = tpf(t ) + (1 – t )p(0).
Equation B.9 governs the evolution of the average price level
in much the same way that Equation B.3 governs the evolu-
tion of the average wage.
2
Equations B.3 and B.7–B.9 can be solved for the paths
of the wage rate and price level:
From Equations 9 and 10, w(0) – p(0) = w*(t) – p*(t) =
θ . Hence, subtracting B.11 from B.10,
It follows that the real wage is procyclical to the extent that
the business cycle is driven by monetary policy shocks.
Straightforward algebraic manipulations establish that
Since t
2 < t for 0 < t < 1, output and employment are more
sensitive to monetary shocks in this economy than they are
in an economy with flexible final-goods prices. (Compare
Equations B.6 and B.13.)
What of persistence? According to Equation B.11, price
adjustment is half completed when ω′ t
2 = 1 – t in the economy
examined here. With flexible final-goods prices, the corre-
sponding condition is ω′ t = 1 – t.The left-hand side of each
of these equations is an increasing function of t, but since 
t
2 < t for 0 < t < 1, it takes a larger t to satisfy the first equation
than the second. In other words, monetary shocks have more
persistent real effects in an economy where both wages and
prices are preset in overlapping contracts than in an other-
wise identical economy in which only wages are preset.
NOTES
1 Equation B.3 is an approximation of the exact formula, which can be
found using the definition of W given in Note 9 to the main text:
w(t ) = [(E – 1)/E ]ln{t•exp[wi(t )E/(E – 1)]
+ (1 – t )•exp[w(0)E/(E – 1)]}.
The approximation will be good as long as wi(t ) is not too different
from w(0).
2 Like Equation B.3, Equation B.9 is a log-linear approximation.
(. ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ () () ]
()






















(. ) ( ) ( )
()
()
() (). B1 2
1
1
0 2 wt pt
tt
tt








 − [] θ
ω
ω
(. ) ( ) ()
()


















(. ) ( ) ()
()
() (); B1 0 0
1













ω17 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  FOURTH QUARTER 2000
economy. The staggered-wage economy would
generate even more persistence than is dis-
played in Figure 1 if our analysis recognized
that some real-world labor contracts are rene-
gotiated only once every three years.
15
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
If the labor market is frictionless—if
wages are flexible and workers can move freely
from one employer to another—it is difficult to
understand how monetary policy changes can
have long-lasting effects on output and employ-
ment. The problem is that any policy that stimu-
lates real activity will also drive the wage rate
sharply higher in such an economy. This higher
wage rate gives firms that are free to adjust their
prices a powerful incentive to raise them. Con-
sequently, for realistic contract lengths the aver-
age price level moves quickly toward its market-
clearing level, and the stimulus to aggregate
output and employment is short-lived.
Staggered wage contracts are a possible
solution to this persistence problem. Workers—
fearful of pricing themselves out of the market
—will not press their wage demands aggres-
sively in response to stimulatory monetary 
policy. Consequently, the average wage level
adjusts slowly. Since cost pressures are muted,
firms feel little need to raise their prices and the
stimulus to aggregate output and employment
persists. This argument applies even if final-
goods prices are completely flexible. (If they are
sticky, persistence is further enhanced.)
Labor immobility across employers is
another possible explanation for persistence.
With immobile labor, the wage a firm must pay
is tied as much to its own labor demand as to
the economywide employment level.
16 A firm
that is able to raise its price relative to others’
following monetary stimulus will find that its
marginal labor costs tend to decline along with
the demand for its output. Consequently, a
smaller price increase is chosen than would 
be optimal in an otherwise identical economy
with mobile labor. Since firms with an opportu-
nity to adjust their prices choose to stay fairly
close to the average price, the average price
moves slowly and output and employment
effects persist.
The results this article reports suggest that
labor-market frictions are potentially significant
quantitatively as well as qualitatively. A key
parameter that measures the speed with which
the price level moves toward its market-clearing
level is likely between one and three orders of
magnitude smaller in an economy with labor-
market frictions than in a similar economy with
staggered price setting, flexible wages, and
mobile labor. The effect is to increase the
amount of time required for the price level to
complete half its adjustment by a factor of four
or more.
NOTES
1 For example, see Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996). The
evidence is not definitive. There is always a danger
that such studies attribute to monetary policy real
fluctuations that are, in fact, caused by unobserved
changes in tastes and technology to which policymak-
ers are reacting—a point Sims (1992) emphasizes.
2 Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) develop the basic
framework. An alternative approach would be to model
the bargaining that takes place between workers and
their employers. For an example, see Benabou and
Bismut (1988).
3 Gust (1997) and Ascari (2000) take this approach.
4 See Taylor (1983) for a detailed look at the length of
union labor contracts and the timing of negotiations.
Even in the nonunion sector, evidence suggests that
wage rates are typically prespecified for a year or
more. For a nice summary of the empirical evidence,
see Taylor (1999).
5 See Koenig (1997) and Andersen (1998) for early
developments of this argument. Ascari (2000) reaches
a superficially different conclusion with regard to
persistence. He is interested in whether labor-market
imperfections similar to those examined here are able
to generate a near-random walk in output in response
to monetary policy shocks—a very high degree of
persistence indeed. A near-random walk in response
to money shocks is required only if one wants to claim
that changes in the money stock are the principal
source of output variation in the economy. These days,
few economists would take so extreme a position.
6 Hence, the analysis presented here is more closely re-
lated to that of Fischer (1977) than to that of Taylor (1980).
7 If anything, relaxing these assumptions would make it
easier to obtain persistent real monetary effects. For
example, it is well known that when contracts specify 
a wage path, real monetary effects cannot last longer
than the longest contract, whereas when contracts
specify a fixed wage, policy shocks are propagated
beyond the longest contract (Taylor 1980). Similarly,
Erceg’s (1997) analysis suggests that making invest-
ment endogenous contributes to persistence, provided
the demand for money is linked to consumption rather
than to income. That moving from a world of sticky
wages and flexible prices to a world of sticky wages
and prices tends to add to persistence is discussed 
in the box that accompanies this article.
8 Empirical estimates Pencavel (1986) reviews suggest
ξ ≈ .25. It is often assumed utility is logarithmic inFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 18
consumption (σ = 1)—an approximation consistent
with estimates Beaudry and van Wincoop (1996)
obtain. On the other hand, Attanasio and Weber
(1994) and Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) report σ ≈ 2.
9 A labor demand curve of this form is consistent with
profit maximization by firms if the labor variable that
enters firm f ’s production function is a composite of
the labor different households supply. In particular, 
if there is a continuum of households indexed by 
i   [0, 1], Equation 2 is obtained if





W ≡ (∫ W i
E/(E – 1)di)
(E – 1)/E,
where Lfi is the amount of household i’s labor used by
firm f (Blanchard and Kiyotaki 1987).
10 Erceg (1997) takes another approach. In his analysis,
monetary policy is non-neutral because of staggered
price contracts, as in CKM. Labor contracts preset
wages—short-circuiting the rise in unit labor costs that
is responsible for rapid price adjustment in CKM—but
hours of employment vary as if wages were perfectly
flexible.
11 A demand curve of this form is consistent with house-
hold utility maximization if the output variable, Ci, that
enters household i’s utility function is a composite of
the goods different firms produce. In particular, if there
is a continuum of firms indexed by f   [0, 1], Equation
6 is obtained if





P ≡ (∫ Pf
Θ /(Θ – 1)df )
(Θ – 1)/Θ ,
where Cfi is the amount of firm f ’s output consumed
by household i.
12 As Note 8 mentions, recent studies suggest σ = 1 or 2
and ξ ≈ .25. Unfortunately, empirical evidence concern-
ing E is almost nonexistent. Studies that examine the
substitutability of one type of labor for another usually
divide workers into only a few broad classes, such as
skilled and unskilled. In the present context, however,
the relevant elasticity of substitution [1/(1 – E )] is that
between the labor supplied by different individual
bargaining units. One would expect this elasticity to 
be much greater than that between skilled laborers 
as a group and unskilled laborers as a group. A high
elasticity of substitution means a low monopoly wage
premium (a value of E close to 1).
13 While three-year contracts are typical in unionized in-
dustries, currently only about 10 percent of workers are
union members. Moreover, CKM examine one-year price
contracts and it seems desirable to compare like with
like. The reader is free to reinterpret the unit time interval.
14 When both wage adjustment and price adjustment are
staggered, 9.9 months are required for the average
price level to adjust halfway toward its new market-
clearing level.
15 To generate a realistically persistent economic response
to monetary shocks, it is sufficient that only a small
fraction of labor contracts be renegotiated infrequently
(Koenig 1997).
16 Recall that I assume households are able to insure
their consumption against idiosyncratic shocks.
Consequently, a higher average level of economic
activity raises everyone’s standard of living and,
through the resultant wealth effect, tends to lower
everyone’s willingness to work.
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